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In the

Supreme Court of the State of ·Utah
HAWAllAN EQUIPMENT CO·MPANY, LIMITED, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case, No.
7188

vs.
THE EIMCO CORPO·RATION, a.
corporation,
Defendant and Appella.nt.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

~~~

t·'·

I

STATEMENT OF F AC:Ts
This is an action for bre·ach of contract. As will appear
from. the argument, it is of the highest importance in reviewing this case that the Court have before it not only a statement as to the pleadings and exhibits received in evidence,
as set forth by appellant, but the situation of the parties
and surrounding circumstances when the contract was
made, as disclosed by the evidence.
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For convenience the respondent hereinafter will be referred to as "Plaintiff" and appellant as "Defendant."
'The plaintiff, ~awaiian Equipment C·ompany, Limited,
is a corporation, organized and existing under the laws of
the territory of Hawaii, with its principal office and place
of business in Honolulu. It is engaged in carrying on the
business of a dealer in machinery and equipment entirely
within the Hawaiian Islands (R. 79, 80, 123 and 159). Sometime during the latter part of June or the early part of
July, 1946, it came to the attention of Malcolm MacNaughton, president of Hawaiian Equipment ·Company, that
certain pneumatic tools, known as chipping hammers and
scaling hammers, stored in government warehouses at
Honolulu in a section designated as "Salt Lake" and bearing
classification numbers, were being offered for sale in Honolulu by the United States Government as surplus property
and he had received reports from employees under him as
to the kind, condition and approximate quantities of the
tools, so far as revealed by an inspection of part of the tools
and from information obtained from representatives of the
government (R. 80, 81, 94, 9:5, 128, 159 and 212). Thereupon, MacNaughton communicated with Samuel T·. Dickey,
Vice President of Hawaiian Equipment ·Company, who was
stationed at San Francisco, California. Dickey was requested by MacNaughton to ascertain whether the.re might
be firms on the mainland which would be interested in purchasing: this surplus equipment (R. 81, 158 and 15H).
In compliance with MacNaughton's communication,
Dickey· endeavored to interest someone on the mainland in
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the purchase of these tools (R. 159, 160). In this connection
it should be pointed out that the government offering had
to be acted on quickly; that there was no market in the
Islands for any substantial part of these tools * * *
"not 10% of them" * * * and that the Hawaiian
Equipment Company had no facilities on the mainland
whatsoever for marketing these tools (R. 80, 166, 167).

..

...

In the course of his efforts to interest someone on the
mainland in the purchase of these tools, Dickey, on August
1, 1946, called The Eimco Corporation by telephone from
San Francisco, California, and talked with its General Manager, Joseph Rosenblatt, at Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 160,
176, 227).
Dickey furnished Rosenblatt the information which he
had received from MacNaughton, concerning the tools and
inquired whether Eimco would be interested in purchasing
them. Dickey pointed out that if Eimco were interested, it
must act quickly. Rosenblatt responded that the matter
would be taken under advisement and he would let Dickey
know whether Eimco was interested (R. 160-162, 177-178,
186-187).

z:.,·

l-

The next day, August 2, 1946, Rosenblatt telephoned
from Salt Lake City to Dickey in San Francisco and advised
that Eimco wanted the tools and woulq pay 55% of their
original cost to the government f.o.b. Honolulu. Dickey
advised that he would cable that offer to his Honolulu office,
which he did (R. 161, 187-188).
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On August 5, 1946, and after receipt of Dickey's cable
containing Rosenblatt's proposal, MacNaughton put through
a telephone call from Honolulu, Hawaii, to Eimco at Salt
Lake City, and a conversation was had concerning these
tools participated in by MacNaughton and also Jack Blades,
a Sales Engineer for Hawaiian Equipment Company, and
by Rosenblatt of Eimco (R. 82). Upon identifying himself
to Rosenblatt apd exchanging greetings, MacNaughton
turned the telephone over to Blades ( R. 105) . Blades informed Rosenblatt concerning the government offering,
identifying it, and advising that the same consisted of approximately 2800 tools, packed in two hundred boxes and
located in government warehouses at Pearl Harbor. Blades
told Rosenblatt that he had inspected some of the tools and
that those examined by him were of various standard makes
and in good condition and that representatives of the government had assured him that all of the tools were new and
in good condition. Rosenblatt indicated that Eimco could
handle all of the tools and might be interested in other surplus property (R. 123-12:7, 135, 141, 206-208).
When Blades concluded; MacNaughton took the ·phone
and explained· to Rosenblatt that he had received advise
through Hawaiian ,Equipment Company's San Francisco
office that Eimco was interested in purchasing the tools
at about 55·% of the original cost to the government, but
that he could not accept this proposal, which came through
Dickey, as a firm bid. Rosenblatt then affirmed Eimco's
interest in the tools at about 55·% of government cost and
MacNaughton ask~d him to "confirm this jnterest definitely
with a positive price indication by cable" (R. 82, 105, 111).
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In this connection it is interesting to note that the original
cost of these tools to the government was $45.00 each for
the chipping hammers and $37.50 each for the scaling hammers, and figured at 55%, this amounts to $24.75 for the
hammers and $20.625 for the scalers (R. 185).
In response to MacNaughton's request for a firm committment at definite prices, Eimco, on August 7, 1946,
cabled Hawaiian Equipment Company as follows:
"Hawaiian Equipment c·ompany, Honolulu.
"Reference hammers bid maximum 24 dollars each
scalers 17.50 each Honolulu will take all. Eimco".
(R. 84-85, Ex. A.)

Upon receipt of this cable on August 8, ~946, Mac~ Naughton contacted the government and purchased the
r. tools. On August 9, 1946, Hawaiian Equipment Company
~ cabled Eimco as follows :
''Joseph Rosenblatt
The Eimco Corporation
Salt Lake City, Utah.
In accordance your cable Hawaiian Equipment
Company sells you sub.ject delivery from surplus approximately 99-2 chipping hammers. 183·6 scaling
hammers 24 dollars and 17 Dollars each respectively
f o b Honolulu preparing for shipment soon as possible. Will advise. MacNaughton".
(R. 86'. Ex. B.)
1

Within half an hour or so after sending the above cable,
/MacNaughton sent a further cable to correct a typographi·;;cal error, r'eading:
Eb

l~~·

:;.,
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"Joseph Rosenblatt
The Eimco ·Corporation
Salt Lake· C'ity, Utah
Regret typographical error in cable scaler price
should be 17.50 each Honolulu per your cable and not
17. MacNaughton."
(R. 87. Ex. C.)
On the same day ·MacNaughton mailed a letter of confirmation to Eimco, in which Eimco was asked for shipping
instructions (Ex. D. R. 88-90, 101-102, 108).
No shipping instructions were given· by Eimco as requested and Eimco refused to accept the goods and pay for
them (R. 90). Under date of August 2·3, 194:6; Eimco sent
a cable to Hawaiian Equipment Company advising, among
other things, that Eimco had no interest in the matter. (Ex.
E. R .. 92,).
Commencing about the date of receipt of Eimco's cable
of August 23, 19~6, and continuing for several months, up
to about June of 1947, the parties, through their representatives, carried on negotiations looking toward the sale and
disposition of these tools on ,some basis that would avoid
any loss to them or litigation (R. 91~9'3, 114, 173). Nothing
came of these negotiations.· Thereafter this suit was com·
menced by Hawaiian Equipment Company to recover dam·
ages· for breach of. contract and upon a trial of such cause,
the case was submitted to the jury on the issues made by the
evidence under proper instructions by the trial court. A
verdict was returned in favor of Hawaiian Equipment Com·
pany (R.. 33:0~331).
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II

ARGUMENT

The plaintiff's complaint alleges a written offer by
defendant to purchase, and plaintiff's written acceptance
thereof, and agreement to sell to the defendant, certain
pneumatic scaling and chipping hammers. The undisputed
evidence showing the situation of the parties and surround'
ing circumstances taken together
with the exchange of
- cables (Ex. A. & B.) establish that Eimco agreed to purchase from Hawaiian Equipment Company the entire
quantity of certain pneumatic tools known as chipping and
- scaling hammers, located in certain government warehouses under classification numbers and then being offered
for sale by the government in Honolulu, the same being
_ capable of positive identification as to make, kind and
quantity.
The make, kind and quantity of these surplus tools,
- which constituted the subject of the contract as ascertained
and identified, .are pleaded, and the undisputed evidence
proves that the tools particularly described' in the complaint
are the identical tools comprising the government offering
and which defendant referred to and offered to purchase
~ from plaintiff.

The principal Issues and contentions relied upon by
.. defendant to defeat this action were settled in the trial
.. court and defendant now asks this court to upset the verdict
and' judgment of the lower court on the grounds that there
r- is an insufficient memorandum to comply with the Statute
of Frauds or assuming the memorandum sufficient, never.-'
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theless, there was lack of mutual assent. The argument to
.follow will be devoted to the specific contentions of the
plaintiff with respect. to these general propositions.
i. DE:FENDANT~S WRITTEN OFFER SATISFIES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS BY STATING THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF
THE CONTRACT WITH REASONABLE' CERTAINTY.

Defendant lays great stress upon the words in Exhibit
"A" "Bid maximum," contending they show an agreement
appointing plaintiff as defendant's agent with authority to
purchase the goods at certain prices. The minutest search
of the record in this case will fail to reveal that there was
any serious effort to present, during the trial of this cause,
any such issue to the effect that while the defendant denies
it made a contract to purchase from plaintiff, still it admits
making a contract appointing plaintiff its agent to acquire
these goods from the government. That thought never entered the head of either party for the reasons which will
hereinafter appear. When Eimco was being pressed to
accept the goods, its response was it "had no interest in the
matter" (Ex. E, R. 92). Surely that is not a response of a
principal to an agent, who has been duly authorized to purchase merchandise on behalf of the principal. /
The correct solution, of course, is to be found in the
following circumstances. During the negotiations leading
up to Eimco's telegraphi-c offer, Eimco had made a proposal
through defendant's San Francisco office to buy from plaintiff at a certain percentage of the cost of the tools to the
government. This didn't satisfy plaintiff's president, MacNaughton, as being an acceptable offer and he asked Rosen-
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blatt to confirm Eimco's interest in these tools "definitely
with a positive price indication by cable," and that is what
Eimco did. Instead of couching its offer to buy at prices
representing a certain percentage of government cost, it
offered to buy at the best or highest price which it was
willing to pay for the tools. This was a firm committment
and plaintiff acted on it. Furthermore, in the telephone
conversation MacNaughton had with Rosenblatt, as quoted
in a subsequent portion of this brief, MacNaughton explained to Rosenblatt precisely plaintiff's position in the
transaction (R. 83).

In support of defendant's proposition that, · "The
only construction possible is that instead of the cable being
an offer to buy, it is in effect an authorization by appellant
to respondent for the latter, as agent, to submit a bid to
the surplus property office * * *,"defendant relies upon
and quotes at great length a ·circuit Court of Appeals
"" decision in the case of National Bank of Commerce vs.
... Lambourne, et al., 2 Fed. (2d) 23. Counsel for defendant
- in commenting on this case state, that the court "antici.- pating that at first blush, since the sugar was the same
as the quantity and quality, the ruling might appear
strained * * *." The ruling was strained, but no more
so than the contentions made by defendant in this case,
and the reasoning of that case was repudiated and the de~
cision reversed on the same points for which the ·Circuit
~~
Court decision is cited and relied upon by defendant.
•
276 U. S. 469, 48 Sup. Ct. 378, 72 L. Ed. 657. Such author.. ities are of no value to this court and could result only in
~
~-

"'

.. J
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leading this court into the adoption of a refuted theory.
·The case of Waggoner Refining Co. vs. Bell Oil & Gas
Company (Okla.) 244 Pac. 756, cited by defend·ant at Page
9 of its brief, which relies upon the Lambourne decision,
concerns the application of the rule that where the seller
is not willing and ready to abide by a material term of acontract, he cannot recover from the buyer. The court's attention, however, should be called to the fact that there is
nothing in the reported decision· indicating, as stated by
~ounsel for defendant, that the term of the contract in question was contained in a printed portion thereof. Nor does·
a reading of the case disclose that the parties treated such
term as immaterial as is defendant's version of the case.
The court states:
"Plaintiff is not in a position to insist that the
contract was not breached on its part in a material
particular, by its refusal to show the defendant as
sh'i pper. The plaintiff evidently considered that
portion of the contract as material, because the only
reason it failed or refused to ship the gasoline as per
shipping instructions, furnished in the telegram of
defendant on June 30, was that it declined to ship
the gasoline and show the defendant as shipper."
However, counsel argues that assuming the court does
not adopt their construction of what was meant by defendant's cable, th~t is, an instruction to an agent to make
a bid, (which agreement would not come within the Statute
of Frauds) then, say counsel, the memorandum is ambiguous
and, therefore, unenforceable because of the Statute.
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The leading authority and author on contracts points
out that even though all of the terms are included in a memorandum or offer, they may be written in such an abbreviated way or with such brief description of the property that
it is not apparent to an uninstructed·person what the meaning of the writing may be. Williston on Contracts, (Rev. ed.,
Vol. 2, p. 1650, Section 576). The gener~l rule applicable 'to
such cases is stated in the following; authorities:
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 23-5, p. 3'24,
reads:
"The court in interpreting words or other acts
of the parties puts itself in the position which they
occupied at the time ~he contract was made. In
applying the appropriate standard of interpretation even to an agreement that on its face is free
from ambiguity it is permissible to consider the situation of the parties and the accompanying circumstances at the time it was entered into-not for the
purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its
terms, but to aid in determining the meaning to be
given to the agreement."
\

The rule is stated in a leading
as follows:

Massach~setts

decision

"While parole evidence is not competent to contradict or vary the terms of such a memorandum to
show what is intended, we are of the opinion that the
situation of the parti~s and the surrounding circumstances at the time when the contract was made,
may be shown to apply the contract to the subject
matter." New England Wool Company vs. Standard
Worsted .Company, 165 Mass. 328, 332, 43: N. E. 122:.)
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In Brewer vs. Horst-Lachmund Company (127 ·Cal. 643,
60 Pac. 418, 50 L. R. A. '240) the court held that a telegram
by an agent to his principal, concerning purchase of hops,
and the principals' telegram to the seller confirming the
purchase constituted a sufficient memorandum for the Statute of F'rauds, and states:
"If there was nothing to lool} to but the telegrams, the court might flnd it difficult, even impossible, to determine the nature of the contract or that
any contract was entered into between t:q.e parties.
But the court is permitted to interpret the memorandum (consisting of the two telegrams) by the light
of all the circumstances under which it was made;
and if, when the court is. put into possession of all
the knowledge which the parties: to the transaction
had at the time, it can be plainly seen "from the memorandum who the parties to the contract were, what
the subject of the contract was, and what were the
terms, then the court should not hesitate .to hold the
memorandum sufficient."
··Cases applying the general rule above stated will be~
cited in subsequent portions of this brief, but in the light of
the evidence introduced in this case when applied to the
words in question, there can be no doubt as to what Eimco
intended.
· Should counsel for Eimco contend, however, that these
words create a doubt or ambiguity, then in resolving such
doubt or ambiguity, the court need apply only the well
established rule that the language or words of a written
contract. are to be taken most strongly against the party
using them. Our Supreme Court so held in Jordan vs.
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Madsen, 69 Utah 112, 252 Pac. 570, which case involved an
automobile dealer's contract, the language of which raised
the question whether an automobile delivered to the dealer
from the buyer was taken on a consignment _for sale or was
sold outright to the dealer at a stated price. In this case
which was appealed from an order sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint, the Supreme Court held that if there were
any ambiguity, it was to be resolved against the dealer, who
was the maker of the contract.
In the Idaho case of Stone vs. Bradshaw, 128 P·ac. (2d)
844, a suit by a broker to recover commissions for the sale
of ranch property, the memorandum involved contained the
language: "I do not think the price is tuff. 3~5000 your com.
5 per sent." The opinion reads (pg. 847-8) :
"Respondents. argue that the wo.rd· 'plus' should
be added to the language used in the letter to make it
read 'I do not think the price is tuff. 3-5000 (plus)
your com. 5 persent'. While upon the other hand,
appellant argues that the word 'less' _should be added
and the letter should read 'I do not think the price
is tuff. 35000 (less) your com. 5: per sent.'
"It will be remembered that the contract ·involved here was prepared, and transmitted to appellant, by respondents; that words were used in the
contract concerning which doubt has arisen, and
which are ambiguous and uncertain. In such circumstances the contract should be construed most
s_trongly against the party preparing it or employi'ng
the words concerning which doubt arises. * * *
· "Testimony thus introduced merely defines or
translates the language of the instrument. It does
not vary or add to the terms of the writing and does
not fall within the parol evidence rule. The testimony
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is admitted for the purpose of ascertaining not only
the meaning of the words· used, but the intention of
the parties. as expressed in the writing. Here we are
confronted with a dispute between the parties. as to
the meaning of certain language used in the contract.
Conceding, but. not admitting, that the words used
a.re ambiguous and uncertain, and that different
minds might well-reach different conclusions as to
their meaning, in such a situation evidence may be
received to ascertain the real intention of the parties.
Jones on Evidence, Vol. 2, 4th Ed., § 455."
.The Supreme Court of Utah applied the same rule in
Boley vs. Butterfield, 194 Pac. 129, in holding that where
a lease of ·a ·grazing per:mit contained a latent ambiguity as
to whether the permit was exclusive or in common with
other parties, evidence as to the understanding of the parties
at the time it was executed. was admissible as it did not vary
or alter the meaning but tended to explain the sense in which
the terms of the instrument were understood. See also Penn
Star Mining Co. vs. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 Pac. 107.
2.. DEF'END·ANT'S WRITTEN OFFER TO PURCHASE. SUFFICIE'NTLY DESCRIBES THE GOODS TO COM'PLY WITH THE
STATUTE OFt F RAUD,S.
1

Counsel for defendant argues at great length that the
"memorandum" is insufficient to comply with the Statute,
as it lacks cert.ainty as- to the prope~ty involved'. The uncontradicted evidence establishes that defendant's telegraphic offer referred to the purchase of all the pneumatic
scaling. and chipping ham-mers then being offered by the
government as surplus property at Honolulu, Hawaii, which
the record shows were located in government warehouses,
packed in 200 boxes bearing government classification num-
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bers and, therefore, capable of exact identification as to
quantity, models and makes (R. 126-128).
The general rule applicable to this point already has
been referred to and authorities cited. (See Restatement
of Contracts, Section 235. Nezv England Wool Company vs.
Standard liVorsted Company, supra). It is based on the
maxim: "id certum est quod certum reddi potest}' The
principle has been applied to contracts for the sale of goods
in the following cases.
In Bartlett-Heard and Cattle Company vs. Harris, 28
Arizona 497, 238 Pac. 327, a telegraphic offer for the sale
of heifers referred to them as "Lassen priced them to us at·
80 dollars f.o.b. Phoenix" and also as "all the heifers you
inspected." Held: "The necessity of parol evidence of all
the cattle Lassen priced and of the ones Stonerod inspected
does not make the memorandum insufficient."

Northeastern Paper Compa~y vs. Concord Paper Co.,
214 App. D. 537, 212 N. Y. S. 218, holds that a contract for
sale of all paper in rolls stored in seller's warehouse sufficiently describes the prop.erty if it may be ascertained
and located by extrinsic evidence.
Zim.merman Bros. and Company vs. First Nat. Bank,
219 Wisconsin 427, 263 Northwestern 361, is an interesting
case because of the similarity of the factual elements to the
present case. In negotiations between the plaintiff and defendant for the purchase of safety deposit boxes by defendant, plaintiff advised defendant that plaintiff had located
approximately 1600 boxes whic:ti could be obtained from a
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receiver of a suburban bank. Defendant wrote to plaintiff:
"This will acknowledge your letter of June 26
and also confirm our conversation over the telephone.
In reference to the Park Ridge safety deposit boxes,
we will ta.ke the boxes."
Defendant subsequently attempted to cancel the order
but in the meantime plaintiff had committed itself to purchase the boxes from the receiver and after making an effort to dispose of the boxes withol!t loss, but without success,
plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages for breach of
contract. H'eld that (pg. 361) :
"The contention of the defendant that the memorandum disclosed by the letters is insufficient because the goods are not sufficiently described is
equally untenable. No more is required than that
there must be reasonable certainty. The descriptions
need not be so minute and exact as to exclude the
possibility that some other goods than .those intended
will also fall within the words of the writing."
In Williams vs. A. C. Burdick and Company (Oregon)
125 Pac. 844, 126 Pac. 603, the court held that a contract for
the sale 9f prunes was completed upon an exchange of certain telegrams, although the ~cceptance made reference to
mailing a contract. The telegraphic offer and acceptance
referred to an entirely different grade of prunes, but the
court resolved this doubt without difficulty by reference to
a subsequent letter of the parties which, while not constituting part of the contract, showed that the parties had
in mind the same thing. The court says:
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"Whether the 'mailing contract' referred to in
the defendant's telegram related to 'thirties' or to
'3.0-40s' cannot be detern1ined from an in~pection of
the message. Any doubt on that subject, howeve,r,
was resolved when the letter accompanying the contract reached New York by mail several days after
the receipt of the defendant's telegram."

•
In considering the authorities cited by defendant, we
might state that we have no quarrel with the general rules
announced therein. The question is one of their applicability
or application of those rules to this case. In a case such as
Kerbin vs. Bigland and Osbqrne vs. Moore, cited on Pages
11 and 12 of defendant's brief, the courts, of course, hold
that where the memorandum omits essential terms of the
contract or is so indefinite and vague that the court, even
with the aid of extrinsic evidence as to the surrounding
circumstances, cannot ascertain the intention of the parties
the Statute is not complied with. While it might be argued
that Lewis vs. Elliott Bay Logging Company, 191 Pac. 803,
cited by defendant, is not strictly in harmony with the great
majority of cases on this point, still the memorandum involved in that case makes no reference whatsoever to the
quantity offered, whereas in the instant c~se, Eimco offered
to "take all" the goods in question. In ·the Lewis case, the
court says: "It should be noted that in appellant's letter the
subject of sale is referred to simply as 'fir.' There is no
mention of the quantity."
·Cases such as Worthheimer vs. Klinger Mills (Ind.)
25, NE (2d) 246, represent that class of case where the
quantity is stated in the memorandum in indefinite terms
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such as "bags," "bales," "cars," etc., and the prices are
stated in different terms of measurement such as "bushels,"
"pounds," etc., and having no relationship to the indefinite
statement as to the quantity. In these cases the courts
generally hold that the statute is not satisfied, in the absence of evidence of any common usage or custom or past
•
dealings between the parties to show the sense in which
such indefinite terms are used. See annotation 129 A. L. R.
P'age 12)30. It will be noted that in this class of cases there
is uncertainty as to both the quantity and price as one is
dependent upon the other, and su9h uncertainty would have
to be resolved by conflicting parol evidence. It is obvious
that these cases are distinguishable from the case before
this court as in this case the price per tool is specific and
the tools involved as above demonstrated were capable of
exact determination as to kind and quantity.
3. PLAINTTF1F
OF

1

DE~FENDANT'S

MADE AN UNQUALIFIED .AJGGEPTANCE
OF'FER.

Defendant raises, for the first time on appeal, the contention that the words "subject delivery from surplus" contained. in "Exhibit B," imported a new term and rendered
the acceptance conditional. Again we make no quarrel with
the rule illustrated by the cited cases to the effect that an
acceptance which imports a new term renders it conditional
and is at most a counterproposal. As &Jtated by Williston:
"A conditional acceptance is in effect a statement that the offerree is willing to enter into a bargain differing in some respect from that proposed
in the original offer." (Williston on Contracts Rev.
Ed. Volume 1, Section 77.)
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The obvious answer to defendant's contention is that
the words in question import no new term nor propose a ·
bargain differing in any respect from .that intended by
Eimco and fully understood by both parties. Rosenblatt's
cable refers to "hammers" and "scalers." The negotiations
pending between the parties concerned solely certain pneumatic tools then being offered for sale by the government as
surplus at Honolulu, and which it ,vas. understood that. defendant would acquire from the government and sell to
Eimco upon receipt of a firm ·committment. The words relied
upon as rendering the offer condit~onal simply state-what
was the understanding of both parties and clearly implicit
in the offer.
Exhibit "B" states in part: "In accordance your cable
Hawaiian Equipment Company sells you * * *." Can
there be any clearer statement of the acceptance of an offer
in accordance with the terms thereof? But, defendant con-:
tends that the words following, "subject· to delivery from
surplus" resulted in obligating "respondent only on condition that delivery can be made or obtained from surplus."
In other words it is contended that "subject to delivery from
surplus" amounted to a statement that the acceptance would
not be effective until a certain contingency happened, namely, the acquisition of the tools from the government. Assuming for the purpose of argument, the correctness of this
construction, still this would not preclude a binding contract. Eimco immediately acquired the goods upon receipt
of the offer. In such a case, Williston states the rule to be
as follows:
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"Where there is an acceptance which adopts unequivocally the terms of the offer but states that
it will not be effective until a certain contingency
happens or fails to happen, then if neither party
withdraws and the delay is not unreasonable, a contract will arise when the contingency happens."
(Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. Volume 1, Section
77-A.)
We submit, however, that the correct rule as applied to
this case is contained in the following statement .by the same
author:
"Sometimes an acceptor from abundance of caution inserts a condition in his acceptance which
merely expresses what would be implied in fact or
in law from the offer. As such condition involves
no qualification of the acceptor's assent to the terms
of the offer, a contract is not precluded."
In Shea vs. Second National Bank of Washington, 133
Fed. 2nd 17, it was held :
"Generally, an acceptance is not inoperative as
such merely because it imposes a condition, if the
requirement of the condition would be implied from
the offer though not expressed therein."
In Frederick Raft Company vs. Afurphy, 110 ·Connecticut
234, 147 Atlantic 709, the defendant, a sub-contractor, sub.
.
mitted to plaintiff, the contractor, a bid on plumbing to be
included as part of plaintiff's bid on the whole job, and
plaintiff after learning of the a ward to him of the contract
through the newspaper, telephoned the defendant that he
had been awarded the contract and when officially notified,
he would notify defendant. However, the defendant at-
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tempted to revoke before official notice was received by the
contractor. The court held it was a binding acceptance by
the contractor and stated:
"That both offer and acceptance to become effectual only in the event that the plaintiff's bid was
actually accepted and the contract awarded to it,
did not detract from the mutuality of their undertaking: The defendants had no right to withdraw
from their agreement after the plaintiff had accepted
their bid, though the contract had. not yet been
awarded to it."
Under the same argument to the effect that the acceptance was conditional and again for the first time on appeal,
defendant contends that while the offer fixes the place of
delivery at Honolulu, the acceptance by adding the words
"f.o.b." rendered it conditional. This contention is so clearly beyond any issue raised by the pleadings, the evidence, or
brought to the attention o:£ the trial court, it should be entirely ignored. The fact is that both parties understood
that the sale was f.o.b. Honolulu. The goods were being
purchased by Eimco for resale on the mainland at a profit.
The abbreviation "f.o.b." has a well defined business meaning of which many courts take judicial notice and as applied
to this case meant that plaintiff would deliver the goods
sold at Honolulu on board a vessel without charge to Eimco.
(See annotation in 16 A. L. R. 597.)
What possible new proposal rendering the acceptance
conditional can be found in the statement that plaintiff
would pay the charges for handling the goods until they
were put on board a vessel for shipment to Eimco.? When
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plaintiff confirmed its acceptance by letter mailed the same
day (Exhibit D) and asked defendant for shipping instructions, did plaintiff reply to the effect that it refused to be
bound because it understood that the goods were to be delivered at Honolulu and that defendant and not plaintiff was
- to pay the handling expenses in putting them on board ship?
'In concluding his argument that the acceptance was
conditional, counsel for defendant say: "This is not a case
in which appellant welched from a bargain as respondent
attempts to establish."
May we state that there is nothing in this record indicating that we have claimed anything beyond the fact that
Eimco breached a bargain entered into with Hawaiian
Equipment Company. Any implications contained in the
word "welch" beyond that are purely 'counsels' conceptio·n
of the situation. But, opposing counsel say not only did
Eimco not "welch" from a bargain, but plaintiff's "action
smacks of bad faith." May we respectfully ask the court's
indulgence for a brief glance at the record?
Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract. Defendant
filed an answer under oath which reads like a treatise on
defenses to breach of contr~ct (R. 7-10). Defendant denies
first that it entered into a contract. It then pleads the
statute of frauds. It claims further a breach of warranty,
which it abandoned at the trial, and also fraud on the part of
plaintiff which has been resolved by the verdict of the jury.
Doubtless, anticipating that these defenses might be of no
avail, defendant further pl~ads and offers to prove that
admitting it entered into a contract, nevertheless it was
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acting in this transaction as a disclosed agent for Charles
M. Weinberg's company at Los Angeles, California, known
as the Brown-Bevis Equipment Company, or, if this defense
failes, then asserts defendant, Mr. Joseph Rosenblatt may
have made a contract but he had no authority to act for the
Eimco Corporation of which he was general manager,
therefore, Hawaiian Equipment Company will have to look
to Rosenblatt personally for any damages suffered ·in this
transaction. Still further, says defendant, if the above
ideas on agency are not acceptable to the court and it isn't
established that Eimco was acting as agent for Weinberg's
company, or that Rosenblatt had no authority to deal for
Eimco, defendant has in reserve a further defense viz:
that Eimco did not offer to buy from Hawaiian Equipment Company-it merely appointed Hawaiian Equipment
Company as its agent.
Defendant's ingenuity was not exhausted by the
above propositions as it has brought forth some new ideas
on appeal such as the assertion that the acceptaNce was conditional because it imported an entirely new term in the
bargain contrary to what was intended by defendant. And,
in conclusion, and should the above contentions be.' not
sustained, nevertheless, claims defendant, plaintiff's action
in promptly acting on defendant's offer and laying out in
cold cash approximately $46.,000 in reliance thereon and its
prompt acceptance by cable as clearly· required by the offer
"smacks of bad faith." We submit that as to this accusation
the record speaks for itself.
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4·. T·HERE wAS· A MEETING OF' MINDS ON ALL THE

ES8EN.TIAL T'ER.MS OF T·HE CONTRACT.

At the outset we desire to bring to the court's attention clearly the precise propositions argued and relied upon
by defendant in the concluding part of its brief as they are
. stated and we understand them, and as they will be answered
in the argument to follow.
Point "5" of defendant's argument is that: "The court
~rred in refusing to direct a verdict for app~llant and in
refusing to grant appellant's motion for new trial," and as
a ground therefor, it is stated: "These assigned errors go to
the same question as the errors in admitting in evidence
Exhibits "A" and "B", and also as to the question of the
insufficiency of tp.e evidence to sustain the verdict, one of
. the grounds of the motion for new trial." Since, as pointed
out by d~fendant, these assigned errors go to the same
questions which already have been argued, there is no
reason ror reiteration of our points and authorities on said
propositions~

Point "6" of defendant's argument is that: "The evidence shows that as a matter of law there was no contract
as there was no .meeting of minds." If, as contended, the
evidence affirmatively shows as a matter of law there was
no 'contract as there was no meeting of minds, then, of
course, the trial court should have directed a verdict for
defendant, as this suit is founded on contract.
In the first place we wish to call the court's attention to
the fact that the pleadings nowhere support the contention
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that Hawaiian Equipment Company was acting as agent fo~
Eimco in these transactions. It is stated under oath in defendant's answer :
"That the defendantJ was at all times, in the
transactions alleged in the complaint, the agent for
Brown-Bevis E·quipment Company of Los Angeles,
California, and that the fact that defendant was so
acting as agent was at all times, known to the plaintiff herein~'' (R. 9.)
This defense, which was unavailing, and for that matter
not argued -in this court, nevertheless, ·is absolutely inconsistent with defendant's present contention and counsel
realized this in his carefully worded ground for a directed
verdict, which is the only ground embodying its contention
that there was no meeting of the minds. Note the exact
words of counsel on this point :

''Conceeding that said two cables constituted an
offer and ~acceptance to buy and sell, they did not
result in a valid contract, because there was no
meeting of the minds." (R. 3~7.)
If the cables constituted an offer and acceptance to
buy and sell wherein was there no meeting of the minds?
We have hereinabove demonstrated that Exhibits ''A" and
"B", when considered in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made as required by the authorities are
definite and certain as to the essential terms of the bargain,
namely, the parties, the goods,· the prices and the place of
delivery. Nothing would be gained by rearguing this subject.
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If as has been argued, Exhibit "A." standing alone
'
appears ambiguous, the _answer is that no ambiguity remains when ·the evidence surrounding its making is considered, as it is proper to do. This· is supported in the Utah
Supreme Court decision cited by defendant, Tynge vs. Constant-Loraine investment Company, 47 Utah 330, 50 Utah 1,
in which telegrams ,concerning an option for the sale of
real estate described the same as "property West side State
Street" and the court said "It was competent to aid the ambiguity by extrinsic evidence which the parties were permitted to. do." However, this decision is not an authority
for the proposition that if, as claimed by defendant, the
language of the written offer, standing alone, is obscure or
ambiguous, then the court, as a matter of law and without
resort to extrinsic evidence, must hold there is no contract
as there is no meeting of the minds. To be logical that is the
position that defendant must take, no matter how untenable, because when the extrinsic evidence herein refered
to is applied ~o the cables, it not only does not show as a
matter of law that Exhibit "A" w.as intended as an agency
contract, but affirmatively shows that it was intended by
defendant and understood by plaintiff as an offer to purchase and this is conceded by defendant in predicating his
request for a directed verdict on the ground that there was
no meeting of the minds.
/

We have already called attention to the well settled rule
of construction which requires that if the words "bid. maximum" are ambiguous as claimed by defendant, then the
language used. by defendant must be taken most strongly
against it. However, there is no need to rely entirely on
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this rule of construction as the record contains affirmative
evidence showing that there was no misunderstanding by
the parties as to the meaning of Exhibit "A" and this being
so appellant cannot maintain its assigned error that there
was no meeting of the minds as a matter of law.
I

This is the evidence: Hawaiian Equipment Company
was a dealer in machinery engaged in buying and selling it
at a profit which was known to defendant ( R,. 86, 15~:).
This was the purpose of its organization and there is no
evidence that it had ever acted in the capacity of
broker or factor. The telegram (Exhibit A) was sent as
the result of a request made to Eimco for a firm bid to
Hawaiian Equipment Company and with a full exptanation of the latter's position in the transaction.
A few days prior to MacNaughton's request for a firm
bid at positive prices, Rosenblatt phoned plaintiff's San
Francisco office and advised plaintiff's representative stationed there, Samuel T. Dickey:
Now, what else did Mr. Rosenblatt say to
you on that occasion?
"Q.

A. That is all. It was a very short conversation. He said, 'We want the chippers and scalers.
We offer 55- per cent of their cost to the, original
cost to the government, f. o. b. Honolulu.'
And I said, 'Fine; I will cable that out to my
office today, my Honolulu office today.'" (R. 188~) ·
On direct examination Rosenblatt testified concerning
his conversation with Dickey:
Now, Mr. Rosenblatt, will you tell the court
and jury what Mr. Dickey said to you on the occasion
· "Q.
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of that telephone call?
A. Well, when Mr. Dickey called he introduced
himself as being with the Hawaiian Equipment Coml?any.
He said he had heard from his people in Honolulu, that the government was offering a quantity of
pneumatic tools out of surplus, and he asked me if
we would be interested in buying them." (R. 229.)
MacNaughton's testimony, which stands uncontradicted
in the record, discloses .,that on August 5, 1946, two days
before Eimco's cable, MacNaughton advised Rosenblatt,
during· a telephone conversation, as follows:
· "A. I also explained to him what our position
in the tranaction would be.
What, if anything, did you say in that explanation?
Q.

A. Namely, that we wanted to get a positive
price from him, and that, if we were able, the Hawaiian Equipment Company, to purchase the tools
for less than that price, the difference between what
he gave to us and what we had to pay the Govern. ment would represent our profit in the transaction.
He said that was all right, that he would confirm
the price by cable, which he did within a day or two."
(R. 83.)

As a part of defendant's cross examination regarding
the same matter, MacNaughton testified:
"A. I identified myself, as soon as I came on
the phone, and turned the phone over to Mr. Blades.
When Blades was through with his conversation, I
then came on the telephone and explained to him in
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some detail our position in this business, that we
were getting a bid from him for these tools, from
him, as representing the Eimco Corporation, for
these tools ; we were going· to take that bid, and then
if we could buy the tools from the government for
anything less than that bid, the difference between·
those two prices represented our profit.

,l_

,

Mr. Rosenblatt indicated that that was all right,
indicated an interest in the tools at about 55> per cent
of government cost.
"Ve asked,him if he would confirm this interest

definitely vvith a positive price indication, by cable,
and the matter was concluded and the cable came
two days later, or three days." (R. 105.)
After the exchange of cables and letters of confirmation, the record shows that the next communication sent by
Eimco to Hawaiian Equipment Company was Eimco's telegram of August 23, 1946, which reads:
"Salt Lake City, Utah, August 23rd.

....

MacNaughton
Hawaiian Equipment Co Honolulu
Rosenblatt vacationing refer your letter August 9th
, to Weinberg Brown-Bevis Company in accordance
Rosenblatts letter to you August 7th Eimco Corporation itself has no interest this matter. (Signed)
Eimco". (R. 92, Exhibit A.)
It must be remembered that if Exhibit "A" was a direction from a principal to an agent to make an offer on behalf
nf the principal it req~ired no acceptance other than the
acquisition of the goods from the government at the prices
specified. Is it reasonable to suppose that during subsequent
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negotiations of the parties continuing for several months
and looking toward the sale and disposition of these tools to
avoid loss or litigation, that Eimco offered to take them
off its alleged principal's hands for the price paid to the
government plus an agent's commission (concerning which
latter the record is silent) ? (R. 91-9'3, 114, 173).
Of course, the answer to all these questions is that Exhibit "A", when read in the light of the evidence, was sent
in response to plaintiff's request for a firm committment
and simply meant and was intended to mean that Eimco
offered to purchase the goods from Hawaiian Equipment
Company, and that the price offered by Eimco was $17.50
each for the scaling hammers, and $24.00 each for the
chipping hammers (and not 55l}o of the original cost to the
government as had been indicated by Eimco in previous
negotiations.)
There is no point in lengthening this brief by taking
up and discussing each case cited by defendant under this
subject, as they stand for the rule illustrated by the famous
Raffles case, which holds that when the extrinsic circumstances are applied to the express language of the contract
and it is. rendered ambi.guous because equally applicable to
two different subjects, then, if it is further established to
be the fact that both parties intend in good faith to contract with reference to different subjects a contract is precluded, as there is a lack of mutual assent. However, it
should be noted that if, in such a case, the fact is established
that both parties intend to contract with respect to the same
subject, then, regardless of the latent ambiguity, a contract
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results.
An interesting comment on the Raffles case is found
in Williams vs. A. C. Burdick & Co. (supra) which reads
as follows:
"Thus a text-writer in discussing this subject
and referring to the c·ase of Raffles v. Wichelhaus,
2· H. & C. 906, says: 'The defendant agreed to buy,
and the plaintiff agreed to sell, a cargo of cotton,
"to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay". There were
two such vessels sailing from Bombay, one in ·october; the other in December. The plaintiff meant
the latter; the defendant the former. It was held
that the defendant was not bound to accept t~e cotton. It is commonly said that such a contract is void,
because of mutual mistake as to the subject-matter,
,and because, therefore, the parties did not consent
to the same thing. But this way of putting it seems
to be misleading. The law has nothing to do with the
actual state of parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties
by their conduct. If there had been but one "Peerless," and the defendant had said "Peerless" by, mis-.
take, meaning "Peri" he would have been bound.' "
Holmes' Com. Law. 309.
Furthermore these cases are not authority for defendant's argument that if the expressed language as contained
in the offer (Exhibit A) appears obscure when unaided by
extrinsic evidence, then as a matter of law there is no contract. But, defendant is driven to this untenable position
because, as pointed out above, when the court is .placed in
the position of the parties and reads Exhibit "A" in the
light of their knowledge and the attendant circumstances,
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the evidence does not show, as defendant assigns error:
"That as a matter of law there was no contract as there was
no meeting of the minds," but discloses that both parties
intended a contract of purchase and sale, and not one of
agency.
In concluding this subject, we wish to call attention to
a fundamental judicial principal that where the evidence
considered as a whole manifests an intention of the parties
to arrive at a bargain, a construction will be given to the
transaction, if possible, which will establish a valid contract rather than defeat one.
In Dick vs. Voggt (Okl.) 16·2 Pacific 2d 3·25, it is said:
"Peculiarly applicable to the facts, disclosed by
the, record in this -case is the first paragraph of the
syllabus to the case of Schoene v. Hicks et al., 16~2
Okl. 2.9-4, 23- P. 2d 170: 'In determining the question
of the existence of a contract, the court will consider
the acts, conduct, and statements of the parties as
a whole, and, if it appears that there was a meeting
of minds on all of the essential elements of the contract, and an intention on the part of both parties
to enter into a contract upon clear and unequivocal
terms, and one of the parties in good faith has acted
in reliance upon the alleged contract, the court
should construe the facts to constitute a contract
rather than to defeat one.' "
In Schoene vs. Hicks et al., 16·2 Oklahoma 294, 23 P·ac.
2d 170, which is cited in the above case, it is stated:
"In the interest of sound business policy the
courts have laid down the following rule : 'In determining whether the facts present the elements of a
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contract, if a bona fide intent on both sides to come
to a definite agreement is shown, it should be construed, if possible, to constitute an agreement rather
than to defeat one.' Neilson & Kittle Canning Company v. F. G. Lowe & Co., 149 Tenn. 561, 260 S. W.
142. See, also, Empire Rubbe.r Manufacturing Company v. Morris, 73 N. J. Law, 602, 6~5 A. 4·50; 13
c. J. 114."
The same rule was applied by this court in Allen vs.
Bessinger and Company, 62 Utah 226·, 219 Pac. 539, which
upheld a contract where the plaintiff offered to furnish a
copy of the official report of certain Interstate Commerce
Commission's proceedings and defendant's response to the
- offer was that: "We will be_ interested in your official report of the definite changes in the handling of freight~ and
..
-· would ask that you put our name down for a copy of same."
III
CONCLUSION
We have endeavored, as we should, to confine our
__ argument to the errors assigned and points argued by der fendant, and in summarizing we will do the same.
1. Defendant's first point is that the court erred in

admitting Exhibit "A" as not setting forth the essential
.~ terms of the contract with the certainty required by the
Statute of Frauds. Under the authorities, the court, in con.-~. sidering Exhibit "A", must place itself in the position of the parties, and, having done so, Exhibit "A", in the light of
•'
the situation of the parties, their knowledge and the attendicy: ing circumstances, states the essential terms of the contract
! ~J( with reasonable certainty.
,.'.;•'

•'
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2. Defendant, for the first time, on appeal, makes the
contention that plaintiff's acceptance, as contained in Exhibit "B", is conditional as importing new terms not contained in the. offer. The acceptance was unequivocal, and
the so-called "new terms" were not new, but implied hi the
offer and an integral part of the bargain as understood by
both parties, and, therefore, under the authorities, did not
render the offer conditional. We have .also called the
court's attention to the fact that, though we accept the
strained construction of defendant, that the acceptance was
not to become effective until the happening of acontingency,
namely, the acquisition of th~ goods from surplus, nevertheless, a contract is not precluded and came into existence upon
defendant's obtaining the goods from the government.
3. Defendant assigns as error the admission of. Exhibit "C" which is merely the correction of a typographi~al
error in Exhibit "B" to which it refers and which was sent
a half hour or so after Exhibit "B". Exhibit "B", having
been properly admitted," there can be no question as to the
admissibility of Exhibit "C".
4. Error is assigned in admitting Exhibit "D" because it was merely a confirmation of the cablegrams between the parties after the offer and acceptance had been
made. Nothing more is claimed for it, but to that extent it
w_as competent and material for consideration by the trial
court.
5. Inasmuch as appelh:.~nt's assignment of error to the
court's refusal to ~irect a verdict for defendant and grant
a new trial is stated to be repe~i~ious of the same questions
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raised by the above assignment of errors respecting the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B", we will so treat it in this
summary.
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6. Defendant's concluding assignment of error is that
"The evidence shows that, as a matter of law there was :no
contract as there was no meeting of minds," the argument
being that the words "bid maximum" contained in Exhibit
"A", "are clearly indicative of an authorization of plaintiff
to bid for and on behalf of defendant." We have directed. the
court's attention to the fact that this point also, is raised
for the first time on appeal because counsel, in his request
for a directed verdict for lack of meeting of minds predicates
it on the concession "that said two cables constituted an
offer and acceptance to buy and sell" (R. 2·53). However,
we have shown further that Exhibit "A", when aided by extrinsic evidence as was proper under ~he decisions of this
court and other jurisdictions, was intended by· defendant
and understood by plaintiff as an offer to buy and not as
an appointment of plaintiff as agent. In this connection it
has been shown that the words "bid maximum" were nothing more than Eimco's response to Hawaiian Equipment
·Company's request for a firm committment at positive
prices, as Hawaiian Equipment Company did not care to
deal in the matter of price on the basis of a certain percentage of the original cost to the government, ·as had been the
basis of Eimco's previous proposals. during the preliminary
negotiations.
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the errors assigned to the proceedings had in the trial court are without
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basis in law as announced by the decisions of this court and
the authorities generally, and the ve'rdict and judgment of
the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

& JONES,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and) R·espondent.

1:~NGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS

W. W. RAY
C. E. HENDERSON
Of Counsel
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